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Introduction 
 
Local government reform in Timor-Leste is critical for the building of an inclusive 
democratic consensus that will bring the state to the people and the people to the state. A 
program of reform is particularly urgent in Timor-Leste. Governance has been both highly 
centralised and handicapped by low capacity. For people in the districts, the central 
government in Dili is remote, public service delivery to the local community poor, and 
opportunities for popular participation very limited. Limited local participation is 
compounded by the electoral system by which voters choose a closed party list of candidates 
in a single national electorate. Members of parliament have no responsibility to single 
electorates: they represent, in effect, everyone and no-one. Local communities are divided 
over their perception of the legitimacy or the relevance of the current government.
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The challenge of building an inclusive and democratic system of governance is particularly 
intense in Timor-Leste. About half of the East Timorese population lives below the upper 
poverty line and a third below the extreme poverty line. Poverty actually significantly 
increased between 2001 and 2007, reflecting the stagnation of the non-oil economy.
2
 For the 
large majority of rural subsistence farming communities, civil society continues to assume 
local, East Timorese forms.
3
 The institutions and agencies of the new state represent modern 
systems of politics that are expected to eventually interact with traditional political systems 
more persuasively than the institutions of Portuguese or Indonesian colonial rule. Local 
communities in the aldeias (hamlets) that make up sucos (composite villages) operate 
according to traditional local belief systems (lisan). Almost all East Timorese, even those 
with a modern education, respect lisan.
4
 
 
                                                 
1
 This paper was presented to the 18
th
 Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in 
Adelaide, 5-8 July 2010. It has been peer reviewed via a double referee process and appears on the Conference 
Proceedings  Website by the permission of the author who retains the copyright. This paper may be downloaded 
for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments, and other relevant legislation. 
  
2 
2 
The local government reforms signal an attempt to correct the preoccupation with the centre, 
and to recognise the critical need to include the ‘periphery’ in state-building.5 Ultimately, 
government in Dili lacks the capacity to simply enforce its authority over its people; it must 
rely on popular consent. What Joel S. Migdal has called ‘normative solidarity’—the 
identification of the people with a national community—has not developed in Timor-Leste.6 
A successful decentralization program involving genuine local decision-making and the 
delivery of needed public services would significantly build ‘normative solidarity’; a failed 
program will further undermine it. It is in this context that an effective model of 
decentralisation is vital.  
 
Does the progress of the reform program so far suggest there is the political will to carry 
through a real transfer of some powers that can correct the imbalance between centre and 
periphery? It will be argued here that there are emerging indications that the answer to that 
question is in the negative. 
 
Contending models of local government reform 
 
Decentralisation is mandated as one of the fundamental principles set out in the Constitution 
(Section 5:1, Section 5:2). The constitutional directive is broad and unspecific. It requires 
legislation to spell out the kind of devolved local government system to be established.  To 
date, only one law has been promulgated, the Law on Administrative Division of the 
Territory (2009). Some four further laws required to establish a new system of local 
government are either before the parliament, being drafted, or not yet under consideration. 
The legislation originates as Decree Laws approved by the political executive, the Council of 
Ministers, and not the National Parliament which, nevertheless, must debate and pass them. 
 
Both the former and the present governments placed decentralisation high on their agendas.
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The 1
st
 Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste (the Fretilin Government) moved early on 
local government reform. In 2003 a report commissioned by an Inter-Ministerial Technical 
Working Group led by the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management 
(MSATM) came up with six options for decentralisation. The Council of Ministers at that 
time approved Option 4. This involved the creation of new provinces or regions responsible 
for new municipalities based on the sub-districts.
8
 This would have created a large number of 
small municipalities responsible to regional councils responsible, in turn, to the central state.  
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The Fretilin Government moved to implement devolution in 2006 but this was overtaken by 
the political crisis of that year and the subsequent election of the 4
th
 Constitutional 
Government (the AMP Government) led by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão in the following 
year. After reconsidering the six options, the AMP Government decided on Option 5b. There 
would be no regions or provinces. The thirteen districts would become thirteen municipalities 
with elected mayors and municipal assemblies. The sub-districts would disappear. In contrast 
to Option 4, Option 5b determined a single level of local government between the central 
state and the sucos and aldeias.  
 
The Council of Ministers released in March 2008 the agreed model of local government 
developed with advice from the joint UNCDF-UNDP Local Governance Support Program 
(LGSP) supported by Irish Aid and the Government of Norway.
9
  
 
The model set out in the March, 2008 document, identified the main objectives of the reform 
as to: 
 Promote the institutions of a strong, legitimate and stable state across the territory of 
Timor-Leste; 
 Promote opportunities for local democratic participation by all citizens; 
 Promote more effective, efficient and equitable public service delivery for the social 
and economic development of the country. 
 
This model adopted among its guiding principles ‘democratic representation and close links 
between the elected bodies at the Suco level and the municipal assemblies with local interests 
represented at the municipal level’. To strengthen this, municipal assemblies would consist of 
directly and indirectly elected representatives. The proposal was that indirectly elected 
representatives could be representatives from the suco councils who, as members of the 
municipal assemblies, would ensure the interests of the sucos were advanced.
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 This proposal 
for suco representation in the municipal assemblies was dropped in the draft law released by 
the Council of Ministers in August 2008 by which all assembly members would be elected by 
‘universal, free, direct, secret, personal and periodic ballot’.11  
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The 2009 Draft Law on Municipal Elections 
 
The Law on Municipal Elections approved by the Council of Ministers in February 2009 
clarified the advisory (rather than an institutionalised) relationship between municipal 
assemblies and the sucos. The draft law merely requires that municipal assemblies will hold 
‘regular’ consultations with suco councils and inform them in advance of any assembly 
meetings. Sucos are to be consulted on proposed local policies that directly affect them. There 
has since been further consideration by the Ministry of State Administration and Territorial 
Management of spelling out the relationship between suco councils and the municipal 
assemblies. This could be set out in supplementary administrative legislation, although 
preferably it should appear in its own decree law approved by the National Parliament.  As 
part of this consideration of further elaborating the proposed interaction between 
municipalities and sucos, a consultant’s report commissioned by the MSATM proposed the 
creation of a Department for relations between Municipalities and Sucos in a Directorate for 
Local Governance in the MSATM.
12
 It should be noted that this approach focuses on the 
supervisory role of the Ministry rather than on the democratic interaction of popularly elected 
municipal assemblies and popularly elected suco councils. 
 
Political risks and opportunities 
 
Successful local government reform would provide for the first time in Timor-Leste 
opportunities for local democratic engagement in governance and empower local 
communities. It would bring government closer to the people and provide local communities 
with a voice. It would improve the delivery of real public services meeting real local needs. It 
would involve a redefinition of the interaction between local communities, municipal elected 
representatives and central government underpinning the legitimacy of the state and 
encouraging the emergence of a civil society supported by and identified with the state and its 
government. 
 
A badly designed and managed program of local government reform will perpetuate a 
centralised, top-down system of governance that will remain unresponsive to the local 
community. The gap will remain, despite elected municipal assemblies and mayors, between 
the state administration and the people in the sucos and aldeias .  
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There are already major political issues associated with the current legislative model. The 
2009 draft law would install a proportional voting system for the municipal assemblies, 
requiring that candidates for elections must appear on political party lists.
13
 The decision was 
that party lists would be closed, denying voters the right to elect preferred individual 
candidates. Closed party lists will entangle municipal assemblies in national party politics 
and introduce national political rivalries into municipal politics. The decision to require 
closed party lists for municipal elections sits oddly with the law that bans party affiliations 
for candidates in suco elections. 
 
Closed party lists for assembly members could encourage a new layer of unresponsive 
political elites and new forms of patronage and family politics. Inclusion on the list and 
ranking on the list are themselves forms of political patronage. At the same time, the paradox 
could be that the threat of ‘money politics’ would increase in so far as municipal politicians 
had the discretion to manage and disburse municipal funds.  
 
The political range of the new mayors will grow in practice, particularly in the biggest 
municipalities such as Dili and Baucau. The mayor of Dili could emerge as a major political 
figure in national as well as municipal politics. The worst case scenario would be the 
development of Philippine-style local political dynasties, what has been described as ‘an 
anarchy of families’.14 The Indonesian experience of decentralisation from 2001 was that 
there were cases where local elites jockeyed for office in order to use local resources for their 
own enrichment and to expand their powers of political patronage.
15
  
 
In Timor-Leste, there will be controls in place for central government to monitor and prevent 
this. The question is, will these controls work? New local patronage networks would 
probably extend upwards to national patrons in Dili. The requirement for assembly members 
to belong to national political parties would seem to encourage this. As the Indonesian 
experience demonstrated after 2001, decentralisation can include the decentralisation of KKN 
(Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme, Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism).
16
  
 
Effective decentralisation will require a change in the prevalent political culture. Devolution 
of decision-making (rather than simple delegation of service delivery) is probably out of line 
with what is instinctively a centralist political culture among political leaders in Dili. The 
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reform model as it developed between March 2008 and February 2009 has become more 
centralist.  
 
This raises larger questions concerning the extent of devolution intended in the reform 
program. It is not clear what arrangements will be set in place to determine which level of 
government will have responsibilities for which tasks. There are issues of ‘functional 
assignment’, how central line ministries, particularly the Ministry of State Administration and 
Regional Management and the Ministry of Finance will transfer line ministry functions to the 
assemblies and mayors. Individual ministries in Dili may be reluctant to surrender to 
municipal assemblies merely service delivery, let alone policy decision-making. Coordination 
between line ministries on the model of decentralisation will present more difficulties, 
although MSATM has the capacity to lead on this. In the Indonesian experience, a rivalry 
developed between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance over the degree of 
devolution of power (the Ministry of the Interior won this contest). Ministerial rivalries could 
also emerge in Timor-Leste as the municipalities are established. Critics of the proposed 
model of decentralisation, including some prominent members of parties in the AMP 
coalition government, question the commitment of the leadership to genuine 
decentralisation.
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An uncertain future for reform 
 
The legislation on municipalities remains before Committee A of the National Parliament. 
Fernanda Borges MP, Chair of Committee A, has warned that the National Parliament will 
take its time to consider ‘difficult questions’ concerning the proposed legislation. The model 
determined by ‘an elite in the Council of Ministers’, she has said, requires much more 
analysis of alternative models of reform as well as extensive public consultation. Committee 
A advised the parliament of its serious concerns about setting up thirteen municipal 
assemblies and failed to see how this would benefit the people.
18
 
 
To go ahead, the local government reform program requires the law on Municipal Elections 
to be approved by parliament as well as other legislation on the functions and competencies 
of local authorities, local financial regulations, and a law on candidacy for assembly members 
and mayors. Some of this legislation is in draft form, some has not yet been drafted.
19
 This is 
one of the reasons why the first four planned municipal elections for 2009, postponed for 
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2010, did not go ahead. Another is the view that the human and physical resources for 
operating municipalities are not ready (although this is disputed). President Ramos-Horta 
recommended in April 2010 that municipal elections should be postponed until 2013. Prime 
Minister Gusmão supported a postponement – to 2014. This will be well after the planned 
2012 general election and will be the responsibility of the new government that is formed 
after that election. Given the concerns of parliament and uncertainty regarding the political 
will of a future government to follow through with real, democratic local government reform, 
the opportunity to redesign the relationship between the state and its people may be lost. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The local government reform program provides a critical opportunity to engage the people of 
Timor-Leste in democratic governance in a way that has been denied them in a centralised 
and fragile state system. To a significant degree, the great majority of citizens do not inhabit 
the political domain of the nation-state. The evidence is that many are alienated from the 
state, question its legitimacy, and seek identity in local domains.  
 
The local government reform program provides a critical opportunity to correct this. The 
changes to the proposed legislative model of reform between March 2008 and February 2009 
suggest that the model of decentralisation is less than democratic and involves the 
entanglement of municipal politics in national party politics. There are doubts concerning the 
commitment of the current leadership to any real devolution of powers to the proposed 
municipal assemblies. 
 
The new system is one that will be phased in through a process of ‘customized 
decentralization’ and it is not yet clear what the final model will be. But the weakening of the 
proposed 2008 model in the introduced legislation, and the injection of national party politics 
into the municipal election process, is discouraging. Centrist tendencies remain strong in the 
government and the ministries. Mismanaged, the new municipalities pose the risk of 
imposing simply another layer of potentially inert bureaucracy and patronage politics on local 
communities, creating new, regional elites of potentially corrupt municipal politicians.  
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